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Introduction
With rising land prices, competing land uses, and low prices for agricultural products,
farm operators must find ways to maintain their economic viability. This is especially
true in the Northeastern U.S. where input costs are affected by increased land prices,
higher assessed values, and taxes. Northeast farmers typically face higher prices for
commercial inputs as well. To improve viability, some farmers focus on product and
market diversification, reduce chemical input use, introduce new food products, and
apply innovative marketing techniques. Organic production is attractive due to the
organic price premium and lower chemical input costs. Moreover, when marketed
directly to consumers, organic production allows farmers to capture a greater percentage
of the food dollar. Despite gains from direct marketing, viability of the farm may still be
a problem for organic farmers. The costs of production may not be covered due to
fluctuating market prices and higher labor costs. Organic agriculture is perceived to be
more susceptible to pests due to the inability to intervene by applying synthetic fertilizers,
insecticides, and herbicides. Perception of this higher degree of risk has led some
producers to seek a new social and economic basis for agriculture, namely Community
Supported Agriculture (CSA) (Lamb 1996; Padel and Lampkin 1994).
CSA is a marketing approach that connects consumers with farmers through
direct purchase of shares of farm product. Most CSAs provide fresh organically grown
produce, but there are CSAs that provide shares of fresh herbs, flowers and animal
products.1 To become a shareholder, consumers agree to purchase a share of the farm’s
produce prior to the season, usually during the winter or early spring. The farmer then
produces the crop and provides a weekly bundle of produce to the consumers throughout
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the growing season, typically from May through October, although some CSA farms
provide winter shares as well. Having sold shares prior to the season, the farmer can then
focus on production throughout the growing season. The CSA principle is
straightforward: by purchasing shares prior to the season, the consumers share the risks of
farming as well as the rewards (Stern, 1992; Karr, 1993).
The CSA concept brings together consumers and farmers with similar ideologies.
CSA shareholders are typically consumers who are interested in where their food comes
from and how it is produced (Cooley and Lass, 1998). Through CSA, the shareholders
develop a stronger appreciation for farms and for the linkages between farms and the
environment (Van En, 1988; Lamb, 1996). The CSA operator has a desire for the farm to
be self-sufficient, vital, and a healthy part of the community (Karr, 1993). If there is a
demand for fresh, locally grown, organic food in the community, CSA farmers can
encourage reliance on locally produced food rather than a dependence upon imported
produce. One objective of CSA farms is to capture this demand and establish a base of
shareholders that will return each year, which further reduces their annual marketing
efforts.
A loyal customer base and a differentiated product may enable CSA farms to
exercise, at least to a degree, monopoly power. In this study, we investigate whether and
to what extent CSA farms exercise market power in their pricing decisions. We estimate
the degree of market power using a structural econometric model. The finding of market
power would suggest that CSAs have been successful in improving the profitability of
family farms, or they at least have that capability.
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Conceptual Model
We assume that a typical CSA farm maximizes profit and has the ability to exercise
monopoly power in selling shares. CSA farms can be considered monopolies because of
their geographic isolation from other farms (few farms in each region have such an
operation). Moreover, the nature of their products, i.e., fresh organic vegetables produced
from a known source, is such that consumer loyalty and “brand” recognition make
consumers captive to a given farm. In fact, many consumers value the non-market benefit
of feeling they are supporting local agriculture and sharing the risks and rewards of
farming in addition to the tangible benefits of fresh produce during the season. Many
CSA farms enhance the sense of community by hosting additional events for their
shareholders during the season and by offering reduced-price shares. These reduced-price
shares may be in exchange for labor, or may be offered to low-income buyers. As such,
produce purchased at the grocery store is a poor substitute for the produce provided in a
CSA share.
Assume that a CSA farm seeks to solve the following maximization problem:
max π = p ( q, Y ) q − C (r, q, E) ;
q

where p(q,Y), the inverse demand facing the farm, is a function of q, the number of
shares sold, and Y, a vector of exogenous demand shifting variables. C(r,q,E) is the total
cost of producing the agricultural goods sold, where r is a vector of input prices and E is
a vector of exogenous factors that affect farm production. Shares are sold during the
winter and each share allows a consumer to pick up a quantity of fresh produce each
week through the summer. Having sold shares prior to planting, the farmer can plan
production accordingly.
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We obtain the first-order conditions for the profit maximization problem and
solve for the share price to determine the supply relation:
p=−

∂p ( q, Y )
∂C ( r, q, E )
λq +
;
∂q
∂q

(1)

where the parameter l is an index of departure from perfect competition and varies
between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (monopoly). Although we assume each farm is in a
position to exercise monopoly power, we estimate l to examine the extent to which farms
choose to exercise market power. If the farmer has altruistic feelings towards her
shareholders, she may seek to forgo some or all of her monopoly rents in the interests of
her shareholders.
The value of the market power parameter is obtained by estimating
simultaneously the supply relationship and the demand equation. There are two methods
to identify the parameter l. The first method is a production theoretic approach following
the work of Appelbaum (1982) where the demand equation and supply relation are
estimated together with factor demand equations. The second method identifies the
market power parameter through rotation of the demand curve (Bresnahan, 1982; Lau
1982). Bresnahan (1989), Sexton and Lavoie (2001), and Sheldon and Sperling (2003)
provide overviews of these two approaches. Applications to agricultural product markets
are provided by Buschena and Perloff (1991), Love and Murniningtyas (1992), and
Azzam and Park (1993). According to Sexton and Lavoie (2001), the choice of the
identification principle depends on the specific application and the types of data
available. The demand rotation method requires the presence of an exogenous variable
that interacts with price to determine demand. For example, changing socio-economic
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characteristics of the market faced by a CSA will cause the demand curve to shift
allowing identification of both demand and marginal cost parameters (Sheldon and
Sperling, 2003).
Assume that the demand equation takes the following linear functional form:
q = α 0 + α1 p + α 2 p * Y1 + α 3 Y2 + ε d .

(2)

Thus, Y1 is the exogenous variable that rotates the demand curve and will allow l to be
identified. The vector Y2 includes other exogenous variables that affect demand.
Assume that marginal costs of production for CSA shares also take a linear form:
MC = β 0 + β1q + β 2r + β 3 E ;

(3)

where r and E represent the input price vector and a vector of other exogenous factors
that affect CSA share production. Using equations (2) and (3), the supply relationship
(equation (1)) can be re-written as:
p = λ q * + β 0 + β1 q + β 2 r + β 3 E + ε s ,
where q* = −

(4)

q
.
α1 + α 2Y1

Equations (2) and (4) form a system of equations that can be estimated simultaneously.

Data
Survey data were obtained by mail from Northeastern CSA farms during 1995, 1996 and
1997.2 Detailed data were obtained about farm and farmer characteristics, revenue from
CSA shares, other sources of farm revenue, farm costs, and the CSA share of farm costs.
There were a total of 82 respondents during the three-year period; some farms
participated in all three years of the survey.3 Table 1 presents summary characteristics of
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the CSA farms that responded. These are small farms by conventional measures and all
were vegetable crop farms. The average amount of cropland was between 18.7 (1997)
and 23.2 acres (1996). The amount of cropland used for the CSA operation was typically
about half the total available. CSA farmers are relatively young, on average about 38
years of age, and educated with the majority having a college degree. Experience, an
additional measure of human capital, was measured by the total number of years of
farming experience (all farm experience) and the number of years of experience on their
current farm. The latter measure is closely correlated with the number of years of
experience producing organically. These farmers typically had between 11 and 12 years
of experience farming, with between six and eight of those years on their current farm.
CSA farmers may make all decisions themselves, or may seek the guidance of a
“core group.” The core group is a subset of CSA shareholders that meet with the farmer
to discuss and advise on issues of share content, price, and other CSA organizational
matters. Core groups may take a passive or advisory role in CSA management by
meeting with the farmer to discuss shareholder concerns or desires. Or, the core group
may take a very active role in organization, promotion, and management of the CSA.
Almost half of the Northeast CSA farms in this sample (48 percent) had a core group.
The different types of shares offered by the CSA farms that responded are also
listed in Table 1. The predominant type of share was the full non-working share, i.e., a
share that typically feeds three to four individuals with no CSA farm work commitment
required of the shareholder.4 A half share contains about half of the produce of an
individual share, which typically feeds one or two people. Some farms also offered other
share types; relatively few “other” shares were sold. These shares were quite varied in
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content ranging from senior shares (a share of reduced quantity and price for senior
citizens) to institutional shares that may serve a large group of people.
A standard measure of output was determined for all farms by transforming the
seven types of shares into equivalent numbers of full shares. The number of shares for
each type of working share sold was weighted by that share price relative to the price of a
full working share for each farm. Similarly, the numbers of non-working shares were
weighted by their share prices relative to the price of a full non-working share. These
weighted shares were then summed to determine the total number of full-shareequivalents, which is used as a unit of output. Share prices were assumed to reflect
differences in both quantity of product and the variety of product in shares. On average,
CSA farms produced a total of 75 full-share-equivalents in 1995 weighing about 374
pounds.5 In 1996, a total of 77 full-share-equivalents averaging about 330 pounds were
sold on average. In the final survey year, 1997, 88 full-share-equivalents were sold with
an average estimated weight of about 324 pounds.
A summary of CSA farm revenues, costs and net incomes appears in Table 2.
Revenues were calculated based on sales of CSA shares. Many farms sold produce
through other outlets such as farmers’ markets. CSA respondents were asked to list
specific costs associated with farm production and the percent of expenses that should be
allocated to the CSA operation. In each of the three survey years, average net income was
positive ranging from $2,724 in 1995 to $8,820 in 1997. On a per-share basis, the CSA
farms surveyed earned about $36 per share in 1995 and about $95 per share in 1996 and
1997. The CSA farms in this sample apparently improved their net income position over
the three years of this study.
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Estimation and Results
Estimation of the demand function required socio-economic characteristics of the markets
served by each CSA farm. We defined each market as the community in which the CSA
farm was located. Community characteristics were measured using 1990 U.S. Census
data for minor civil divisions or MCDs (e.g., townships) where available. If MCD data
were not available for a specific farm location, Census designated place data were used.
The data collected included population density, median household income, and
percentage of high school and college graduates. These community characteristics and
variables related to the operation of the CSA, which are included in the supply
relationship equation, are described in more detail in Table A of the appendix. Table B of
the appendix provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in estimation. Given
the cross-sectional nature of these data, we assume a common demand and cost structure
across markets and farms respectively. Thus, the estimated parameters represent the
parameters of common demand and cost functions for all CSA farms.
The model was estimated using pooled time series and cross-sectional data. All
income, revenue and cost data were deflated to 1995 using the Consumer Price Index;
tests conducted supported pooling all observations. We tested for the presence of
heteroskedasticity as well; results of the chi-square test led us to conclude
heteroskedasticity was not an issue with our model. The estimation of a structural model
(demand and supply relationships) allows estimation of the degree to which CSA farms
exert monopoly power. Identification was obtained by interacting share price and median
income in the demand equation. Estimation of the demand and supply relationship system
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was done using a two-step procedure. The demand relationship was estimated and the
parameters were used to create the variable q* (see equation (4)). This variable and
quantity (q) were included in the final supply relationship. Both q* and q are endogenous
and two-stage least squares was used to estimate the final supply relationship.
Estimates for the structural model, both demand and supply relationships, are
presented in Table 3. CSA farms do appear to exert market power, albeit very little. The
estimated market power parameter is 0.02. While the estimated market power parameter
was statistically different from zero, it suggests CSA farms exert very little market
power, only about two percent of that of a monopolist.6
The coefficients of demand-side variables are mostly as expected. Share price has
the expected negative sign, but does not appear statistically different from zero. However,
including both share price and the interaction of share price and median income leads to a
troublesome degree of multicollinearity. The partial effect of price on demand, which
combines the price effect as well as the interaction, is negative and results in a price
elasticity of demand of –0.245 when evaluated at the means of quantity, price and
income. The effect of income on demand was negative, although not statistically different
from zero. Income may be a proxy for the amount of spare time available. Thus, the
negative effect of income, an elasticity of –0.22 determined using the partial effect,
would indicate that has income increases, there is less time to learn to prepare and to
cook the large of amount of produce in a share, thus reducing the demand for CSA
shares. The standard errors for income, as well as those for all other estimated
parameters, did not suffer from multicollinearity as did the estimates for the price and
price-income interaction variables.
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The percentage of high-school graduates has a negative and significant effect on
demand. The coefficient indicates that an increase in the percentage of high school
graduates by one percent results in a decrease in demand by 2.44 shares. The coefficient
for the percentage of college graduates is positive, but not statistically significant. While
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem between these variables and median
income, these two variables may capture some of the income effects on demand. The
positive coefficient of the percentage of college graduates may represent the effects of
higher income on demand for that cohort. The estimated effect of a higher percentage of
residents with a college degree would indicate that having a higher education results in a
greater demand for CSA shares. More education may be associated with greater
awareness of nutrition and a preference for organic produce and, thus, a greater demand
for local fresh organic vegetables. Higher levels of education may also be associated with
an appreciation for the issues surrounding family farms and the benefits of agriculture to
the community.
Population density is statistically significant and positively affects demand for
CSA shares. Population density indicates greater potential demand for the CSA within
their market area. Consumers living in more densely populated areas are also likely to
have a greater demand for CSA shares because they may have less space for a garden and
may enjoy the access to the farm outdoor space. Having a core group increases the
demand by about 105 shares, most likely because of stronger interactions between the
CSA and the community through additional events and services organized by the core
group. Finally, binary variables were included for two of the three years that CSA data
were collected (1996 and 1997; 1995 was used as the base year). The estimated effects of
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the binary variables for 1996 and 1997 are statistically insignificant confirming our
pooling tests for these three years of data.
Two estimated coefficients were statistically significant and the signs were as
expected in the supply relationship. The estimated market power parameter was
statistically significant and indicates that CSA farmers exerted only about two percent of
the market power of a monopoly. In previous research, Cooley and Lass found that CSA
share prices provided important consumer benefits. The CSA ideology is that farmers
earn a return that covers all costs and provides a living wage. Our results suggest that
CSA farmers can ensure that they do cover all economic costs of production, include a
fair wage for the farmer. This result is encouraging when we consider that most farmers
act as the residual claimant to profits that are typically low or non-existent.
Core group farms have higher share prices by about $155 per share. We find that
core group farms are typically larger farms with a more stable shareholder base and
possibly a waiting list. Core groups are a group of shareholders who are typically
committed to the CSA ideal and value the farmer’s commitment and services. They may
be more willing to compensate the farmer for her efforts. The core group helps the farmer
with organization and promotion of many CSA activities that enhance the CSA. These
activities may increase demand, but may also imply additional costs. Two variables in the
model represent the effects of changing size and scale, quantity and CSA cropland
acreage. The effects of these two variables are a priori unknown. The negative estimated
effect of CSA quantity (number of shares) suggests that greater output leads to a decrease
in marginal costs. A change in the scale of the operation, through increased cropland, has
a positive effect on price. As CSA cropland acreage is increased, ceteris paribus,
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marginal costs shift upward suggesting decreasing returns to scale for these CSA farms.
This positive effect makes sense given the importance of the labor input for these organic
producers.
The primary farmer’s all-farm experience has a negative impact on the share
price. Having more farm experience is associated with a lower cost of operation and a
lower share price. Current farm experience has a positive effect on share price. Current
farm experience is more closely associated with the farmers experience as an organic
producer, which may lead to higher marginal costs. Current experience is also more
closely associated with the farmer’s experience as a CSA farmer, which may also imply
higher marginal costs. Consistent with expectations, the effect of education, an additional
human capital measure, is to reduce marginal cost. However, the estimated effect is not
statistically different from zero.

Summary and Conclusions
CSA is an alternative form of marketing. Most CSA farms are small vegetable farms that
provide shareholders fresh organic produce through the growing season. CSAs strive to
develop a loyal and stable customer base (shareholders) that will reduce (or ideally
eliminate) the need to market their product each year. CSAs thus try to capture a share of
the local market for fresh produce and set the price of a share each year. Using pooled
cross-section time-series data for a sample of Northeast CSA farms, we found that CSA
farms are able to dictate prices, but they appear to exert a small degree of monopoly
power in the choice of share prices. CSA farms only exert about two percent of their
potential monopoly power. While the estimated market power parameter was statistically
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different from zero, we might question whether the magnitude is economically
significant. However, exertion of a limited degree of market power exerted increases the
profitability of family farms. Our results suggest that CSA farmers can command a fair
price for their product, a price that covers all production costs and a fair wage for the
farmer. Moreover, CSA farms use sustainable production methods and are committed to
building a relationship with the community in which they operate. Our results suggest
that CSA farms have the power to price above marginal costs, but for a variety of
reasons, they choose to exert very little of that power. Pricing decisions by CSA farms,
while dependent upon demand factors, are likely affected by altruistic feelings of the
farmer towards shareholders. Thus, our findings suggest that the CSA movement in
New England improves the profitability of family farms through minimal exercise of
market power and provides a benefit to the community without government intervention.
Future research will examine whether those findings hold at the national level.
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Table 1. Farm Characteristics for the Average CSA Operation in 1995, 1996 and 1997
1995

1996

1997

23

26

33

Total Cropland (acres)
CSA Cropland (acres)

22.20
11.96

23.19
10.79

18.72
7.59

Age of Principal Farmer (years)

39.87

38.48

38.41

0.74

0.85

0.82

11.43

11.04

11.73

Current-Farm Experience (years)

6.22

7.00

8.24

Core Group (proportion of CSA farms with a core
group)

0.48

0.42

0.48

Number of Farms

Education (proportion of primary farmers with a
college degree)
All Farm Experience (years)

CSA Share Prices ($ per share)
Non-working Shares:
Full
Individual
Half
Working Shares:
Full
Individual
Half
Other (Senior, Institutional)

416.32
326.00
243.75

412.88
298.29
247.00

352.98
270.56
273.35

260.67
N/A
135.00
307.50

248.89
205.00
131.67
358.33

246.39
136.25
132.50
266.43

Number of Full Share Equivalents

75.11

77.36

88.07

Pounds of Product per Full Share

374.17

329.85

324.20
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Table 2. Costs and Revenue for the CSA Operations.
Average $ - 1995

Average $ - 1996

Average $ - 1997

per Farm

per Share

per Farm

per Share

per Farm

per Share

Reported Revenue
Reported Costs

$33,398
$30,674

$444.77
$408.50

$35,568
$28,254

$460.18
$365.56

$32,182
$23,362

$349.65
$253.82

Net Income

$ 2,724

$ 36.27

$ 7,313

$ 94.62

$ 8,820

$ 95.83
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Table 3. Estimated parameters of the structural model of Northeast CSA market power.
Variable

Demand (Quantity)

Constant

187.98*
(2.45)
--

Market Power
Quantity
Price
Median Income
Price×Median Income
% High School Grads
% College Grads
Density

--0.109
(-0.66)
-0.001
(-0.72)
1.72×10-6
(0.47)
-2.444*
(-2.21)
0.976
(0.60)
0.029*
(3.61)
--

Supply Relationship
(Price)
332.342*
(5.17)
0.021*
(1.96)
-0.667
(-1.31)
-------

R2

104.861*
(5.90)
8.420
(0.42)
13.830
(0.72)
0.487

2.089
(1.38)
-6.273
(-0.12)
-5.383
(-1.24)
6.563
(1.28)
155.334*
(2.62)
24.146
(0.47)
-50.226
(-0.99)
0.260

F

7.59*

2.81*

CSA Cropland
Education

--

All Farm Experience

--

Current Farm Experience

--

Core Group
Year 1996
Year 1997

* Indicates variables that are statistically different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
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Appendix
Table A: Variable descriptions.
Variable
Quantity
Price
Median Income
Price×Median Income
High School Grads
College Grads
Density
CSA Cropland
Education
All Farm Experience
Current Farm Experience
Core Group
Year 1996
Year 1997

Description
The total number of shares sold expressed as full shares, also
called full-share-equivalents. The variable is calculated as a
weighted average of different share types where the weights are
the share prices relative to the price of a full non-working share.
The price of a full non-working share ($/share).
The median income is the town-level median income from the
1990 U.S. Census (dollars).
This is an interaction term. The full non-working share price is
multiplied by the town-level median income. This variable
allows identification of the market power parameter in the
structural equation model.
The percentage of the town population with a high school degree
as their highest level of education attained.
The percentage of the town population with a college degree as
their highest level of education attained.
The number of people per square mile.
The number of acres of cropland used for the CSA operation.
A binary variable that takes the value of one if the farmer has a
college degree and zero otherwise.
The number of years of farming experience of the farm operator.
The number of years of experience of the farm operator on the
current farm.
A binary variable that takes the value of one if the CSA has a
core group. A core group is a subset of the shareholders who
meet with the farmer to discuss share content, share price, and
other CSA management/social issues.
Binary variable: 1 if 1996 data, 0 otherwise.
Binary variable: 1 if 1997 data, 0 otherwise.
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Table B. Descriptive statistics for variables used in estimation.
Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Quantity (number of full-share-equivalents)

81.04

92.02

Price ($ per full share)

386.72

180.26

33,407.37

12,803.07

High School Grads (percent)

63.18

10.78

College Grads (percent)

22.09

9.33

Density (people per square mile)

980.05

1,223.02

9.83

18.80

Median Income ($)

CSA Cropland (number of acres)
Education (proportion of primary farmers with a college
degree)
All Farm Experience (years)

0.80

0.40

11.43

7.27

Current Farm Experience (years)

7.28

6.04

Core Group (proportion of CSA farms with a core group)

0.46

0.50

Year 1996 (proportion of observations from 1996)

0.32

0.47

Year 1997 (proportion of observations from 1997)

0.40

0.49
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Endnotes
1. A national survey of CSA farms found that over 94 percent produced organically
(Lass, et al.).
2. Respondents were from the following states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
3. Response rates were: 46 percent, 35 percent and 33 percent, in 1995, 1996 and 1997,
respectively.
4. On many CSA farms, shareholders can obtain reductions in the price of a share by
working on the farm.
5. CSA respondents were asked to estimate the weight of produce contained in a full
share in a typical week by month. Because the weights per share were estimates, we felt
that share prices were the most accurate variables available to use as weights in creating
the number of full-share-equivalents.
6. Initially, we estimated the model in reduced-form, i.e., price as a function of all
exogenous variables. Using this method, the presence, but not the extent, of market
power can be determined. In perfect competition, price equals marginal cost. Thus
imposing a set of zero restrictions on exogenous demand shifters constitutes a test of
perfect competition. Using a chi-square test on those restrictions, we rejected the
hypothesis of perfect competition at the one percent level of statistical significance,
concluding that the finding of market power is robust. In fact, the market parameter
estimates varied little with changes in model specification ranging from a low of around 2
percent to just over 4 percent. While we are admitting to a limited specification search
exercise, there are no other cross-sectional, firm-level analyses to guide us.
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